This is the first serious analysis of the combat capability of the British army in the Second World War. It sweeps away the myth that the army suffered from poor morale, and that it only won its battles thorugh the use of 'brute force' and by reverting to the techniques of the First World War. David French analyses the place of the army in British strategy in the interwar period and during the Second World War. He shows that after 1918 the General Staff tried hard to learn the lessons of the First World War, enthusiastically embracing technology as the best way of minimizing future casualties. In the first half of the Second World War the army did suffer from manifold weaknesses, not just in the form of shortages of equipment, but also in the way in which it applied its doctrine. Few soldiers were actively eager to close with the enemy, but the morale of the army never collapsed and its combat capability steadily improved from 1942 onwards. Professor French assesses Montgomery's contributions to the war effort and concludes that most important were his willingness to impose a uniform understanding of doctrine on his subordinates, and to use mechanized firepower in ways quite different from Haig in the First World War.
This title challenges popular views of the First World War as catastrophic and futile and the Second World War as a well-conducted and victorious moral crusade.
This book explores the formation's origins, the scale of defeat in France and the campaign's considerable legacy.
In late 1943, the British army ordered the veteran 7th Armored, 51st (Highland), and 50th (Northumbrian) Divisions to return to the Great Britain to provide combat experienced troops for the invasion of northwest Europe.
Army, Empire, and Cold War will interest not only historians of the British army, but also those who are trying to understand Britain's role in the Cold War, and how and why the British came to surrender formal rule over their empire.
1957; R. Anderson to Hare, 13 Nov. 1957. 54 Ibid. Hare to Urquhart and Hakewill-Smith, 19 Nov. 1957. 55 Ibid. GOC Scottish Command to CIGS, 23 Nov. 1957. 56 S. Fowler, '''Pass the hat for your credit's sake...and 243 CIVILIANS AND THEIR ...
89 90 J. Lonsdale, 'Mau Maus of the mind: making Mau Mau and the remaking of Kenya', Journal of African History, vol. 31, no. 3 (1990), 393–421; R. Palmer, 'European resistance to African majority rule. The Settlers and Residents ...
Labour's last Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths, took this advice to heart.136 Wright was summoned to London and told in no uncertain terms that he would not be granted most of the powers he sought. Griffiths' policy was 'that ...
From award-winning war reporter Damien Lewis, the untold story of the heroic hellraisers who stormed a Nazi fortress—in one of the most daring raids of World War II . . . Winter, 1944.
A Royal Army Medical Corps motorcyclist tows a patient on a Miller James wheeled stretcher from a Regimental Aid Post to a ... The very popular G3/L 347cc, with its 'teledraulic' front forks, was tested in 1940 and produced all the way ...
Place, Military Training in the British Army 1940–1944, pp. 41, 79; French, 52. Raising Churchill's Army, pp. 39–40. Myatt, The British Infantry 1660–1945, pp. 195–8; French, Raising 53. Churchill's Army, p. 38.