Within the contemporary philosophical debates over the nature of perception, the question of whether perception has content in the first place recently has become a focus of discussion. The most common view is that it does, but a number of philosophers have questioned this claim. The issue immediately raises a number of related questions. What does it mean to say that perception has content? Does perception have more than one kind of content? Does perceptual content derive from the content of beliefs or judgments? Should perceptual content be understood in terms of accuracy conditions? Is naive realism compatible with holding that perception has content? This volume brings together philosophers representing many different perspectives to address these and other central questions in the philosophy of perception.
In this book, Brit Brogaard defends the view that visual experience is like belief in having a representational content.
Some of the essays in this book defend the orthodoxy; most criticize it; and some propose alternatives to it. Many of the essays are classics.
In Cognition and Perception, Athanassios Raftopoulos discusses the cognitive penetrability of perception and claims that there is a part of visual processes (which he calls “perception”) that results in representational states with ...
consciousness does not exist.” But what they say is consciousness is really something else. In Daniel Dennett's case, he says it is really just a computer program running in the brain. And in John Campbell's case, he says conscious ...
Susanna Siegel argues that these two aspects of the mind become deeply intertwined when beliefs, fears, desires, or prejudice influence what we perceive.
An argument that perception is something we do, not something that happens to us: not a process in the brain, but a skillful bodily activity.
This book presents a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perception that is informed by empirical research.
J. Christopher Maloney argues that, unlike other cognitive modes, perception is in fact immediate, direct acquaintance with the object of thought.
Useful examples are included throughout the book to illustrate the puzzles of perception, including hallucinations, illusions, the laws of appearance, blindsight, and neuroscientific explanations of our experience of pain, smell and color.
Buddhist philosophy of Anicca (impermanence), Dukkha (suffering), and