Richard Swinburne presents a powerful case for substance dualism and libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental and physical events are distinct, and defends an account of agent causation in which the soul can act independently of bodily causes. We are responsible for our actions, and the findings of neuroscience cannot prove otherwise.
Making a Scientific Case for Conscious Agency and Free Will makes a series of arguments that certain human behaviors are impossible to explain in the absence of free will, and that free will emerges from materialistic processes of brain ...
While, for instance, hijacking of the will is a profound way in which the will may be affected by mental disorders (see also next section on free will), the mere introduction of an either repulsive or attractive factor appears to leave ...
Sam Harris, bestselling author of THE END OF FAITH takes on one of today's liveliest issues: whether or not we actually have free will.
Not so, argues the renowned neuroscientist Michael S. Gazzaniga in this thoughtful, provocative book based on his Gifford Lectures——one of the foremost lecture series in the world dealing with religion, science, and philosophy.
not. a. one-armed. bandit. Against the backdrop of the hard problem of free will, the very concept of the will was introduced to the history of philosophy. Admittedly, this concept was severely criticized, though it was also accepted by ...
In clear, scientifically rigorous terms, Christian List explains that free will is like other real phenomena that emerge from physical laws but are autonomous from them—like an ecosystem or the economy—and are indispensable for ...
This book was the end product of life experiences, thoughts and intellectual wanderings of the author, who through his career and for the last twenty years was always serving all the three aspects of a Psychiatrist: He is a clinician, a ...
Weiland, Liu, and Humayun, 2005; Dowling, 2009. Appendix C. Content-Addressable Memory 1 . Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986; Hertz, Krogh, and Palmer, 1991; Churchland and Sejnowski, 1994. 2 . McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986; Lakoff, ...
This book investigates whether it is possible to have a science in which there is room for human freedom.
The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists.