Reformulating a problem of both constitutionalism and liberalism discussed in the works of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Hannah Arendt, and Alexis de Tocqueville, the book examines one generally overlooked manifestation of constitutionalism: the role of the courts in shaping democratic politics and the inter-relationship between citizens and state. Drawing on constitutional history, law, and political theory, David Miles argues that constitutionalism cannot be seen merely as an institutional mechanism to limit government, as it also has a crucial civic dimension upon which the liberal state depends. Utilising the works of Böckenförde, Arendt, and Tocqueville, constitutionalism is conceived in the book as part of a broader system of communal norms which sustains representative democracy and liberalism. Through an analysis of judicial interventions in the electoral processes of the United States and Germany, Miles explores the role of civil society actors in transforming constitutionalism through legal challenges to oligarchical or exclusionary practices. He assesses how, in adjudicating these cases, the US Supreme Court and the German Constitutional Court have mediated the tension between threats to stability and the imperative of democratic renewal. Democracy, the Courts, and the Liberal State will be of interest to scholars, students, and practitioners interested in comparative politics, political theory, and constitutional law and history.
What resources do we have, Frohock asks, to develop a version of public reason which can succeed even in the deep pluralism anticipated in democratic practices?
This book provides a concise overview of the institutions of government in modern democracies, including constitutions, legislatures, heads of state and of government, variations of federalism, and electoral systems.
Throughout the book, the author underlines the complementary roles of markets and the state, and the importance of building state capacity to assure administrativeefficiency, always having in count the 'democratic constraint', i.e., the ...
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This is something even judges occasionally recognize , as shown in Jonathan M. Cohen , Inside Appellate Courts : The Impact of Court Organization on Judicial Decision Making in the United States Courts of Appeals 50–51 ( 2002 ) ...
Unlike the progressives before them and the Hooverians who followed , not to mention the New Deal " brain trusters , " the men who came to Washington in the Harding - Coolidge years had no grander design than to restore " normalcy .
The essays in this volume explore issues where law, morality and politics meet, and discuss some of the key challenges facing liberal democracies.
In the light of the books research, the author suggests that there is a need to know more about the internal workings of democracies to justify the claim that liberal democracy represents the most attractive set of political institutions.
Courts promote the prudent use of power in each of these approaches. This book evaluates the implications of this argument using a century of global data tracking judicial politics and democratic survival.
Analyzing the electoral systems of various countries, including those of developing nations, this work examines the relationship between democratic theory values and the electoral institutions used to achieve them.