The Levels of Action
Tackles one of the most enduring and contentious issues of positive political economy: common pool resource management.
This volume contains sixteen original articles documenting recent progress in understanding strategic behaviour.
... Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, The University of Michigan Press. Ostrom, E. (2000) “Collective action and the evolution of social norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, pp. 137–58. Pereau, J.-C., L. Mouyseet, and L ...
... commons : self- governing irrigation systems can work . Journal of Economic Perspectives , 7 ( 4 ) : 93– 112 , 1993 . [ 152 ] E. Ostrom , R. Gardner , and J. Walker . Rules , Games and Common - pool Resources . Ann Arbor , The ...
Drawing on the classic work of Elinor Ostrom and the readings of political ecology, this book questions the application of exclusive property rights to mobile pastoralism and rangeland resource governance.
A leader in applying game theory to the understanding of institutional analysis, Elinor Ostrom provides in this book a coherent method for undertaking the analysis of diverse economic, political, and social institutions.
These are examples of a more fundamental question addressed in this book: why do people cooperate for the welfare of their community, state, or organization?
The implicit heroes are Western wildlife scientists, environmental activists, and the conservation armies who rout the poachers. The indigenous people are implicated because of their proximity to the parks and the logistics of outside ...
... Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. Ostrom E., Walker J., Gardner R., 1992, “Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible,” American Political Science Review 86, n. 2:404 ...
Integrating aspects of philosophy, political science, and some environmental science, this text provides a multidisciplinary approach to environmental economics and natural resources policy.