Economists, psychologists, and marketers are interested in determining the monetary value people place on non-market goods for a variety of reasons: to carry out cost-benefit analysis, to determine the welfare effects of technological innovation or public policy, to forecast new product success, and to understand individual and consumer behavior. Unfortunately, many currently available techniques for eliciting individuals' values suffer from a serious problem in that they involve asking individuals hypothetical questions about intended behavior. Experimental auctions circumvent this problem because they involve individuals exchanging real money for real goods in an active market. This represents a promising means for eliciting non-market values. Lusk and Shogren provide a comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions. It will be a valuable resource to graduate students, practitioners and researchers concerned with the design and utilization of experimental auctions in applied economic and marketing research.
Real choice experiments (RCEs) and experimental auctions (EAs) are two non-market valuation methods which have increasingly been used to elicit consumers' preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for food products.
When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants.
The volume is divided into two parts. In Part I, interviews with prominent researchers in the field, all invited speakers at the Symposium, are presented.
Economists, psychologists, and marketers are interested in determining the monetary value people place on non-market goods for a variety of reasons: to carry out cost-benefit analysis, to determine the welfare effects of technological ...
This book presents two experimental studies that deal with the comparison of multi-item auction designs for two specific applications: the sale of 2.6 GHz radio spectrum rights in Europe, and the sale of emissions permits in Australia.
However, this is not to say that people cannot misrepresent their preferences or be influenced by other factors. The second part of the dissertation investigated the consistency between WTP and preference in experimental auctions.
John H. Kagel, Dan Levin. Capen, E. C., R. V. Clapp, and W. M. Campbell, “Competitive Bidding in High-Risk ... Dessauer, J. P., Book Publishing, Bowker, New York, 1981. Dyer, D., J. H. Kagel, and D. Levin, “A Comparison of Naive and ...
“Effect of Market Organization on Competitive Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1964, 78, I81-201. , “Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian Hypothesis,” Journal of Political Economy, August 1965, 73, ...
Even less collusive results were reported by Kruse et al . ( 1990 ) . These authors conducted a series of fifteen sixty - period posted - offer markets with four sellers and simulated demand , in a purposely unstable design ( seller ...