It seemed that whenever Mussolini acted on his own, it was bad news for Hitler. Indeed, the Fuhrer's relations with his Axis partners were fraught with an almost total lack of coordination. Compared to the Allies, the coalition was hardly an alliance at all. Focusing on Germany's military relations with Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland, Richard DiNardo unearths a wealth of information that reveals how the Axis coalition largely undermined Hitler's objectives from the Eastern Front to the Balkans, Mediterranean, and North Africa.
DiNardo argues that the Axis military alliance was doomed from the beginning by a lack of common war aims, the absence of a unified command structure, and each nation's fundamental mistrust of the others. Germany was disinclined to make the kinds of compromises that successful wartime partnerships demanded and, because Hitler insisted on separate pacts with each nation, Italy and Finland often found themselves conducting counterproductive parallel wars on their own.
DiNardo's detailed assessments of ground, naval, and air operations reveal precisely why the Axis allies were so dysfunctional as a collective force, sometimes for seemingly mundane but vital reasons-a shortage of interpreters, for example. His analysis covers coalition warfare at every level, demonstrating that some military services were better at working with their allies than others, while also pointing to rare successes, such as Rommel's effective coordination with Italian forces in North Africa. In the end, while some individual Axis units fought with distinction—if not on a par with the vaunted Wehrmacht—and helped Germany achieve some of its military aims, the coalition's overall military performance was riddled with disappointments.
Breaking new ground, DiNardo's work enlarges our understanding of Germany's defeat while at the same time offering a timely reminder of the challenges presented by coalition warfare.
German Revolutionists of 1848: Surnames A through F
259; Neal, pp. 159-60; Davis (New York), p. 263; Voss, p. 280; Urofsky, p. 247. FDR biographer Kenneth S. Davis concluded that Roosevelt had not only attacked Wise and Holmes “on grounds palpably sophistic but also ...
35 32 The text was apparently known to Jacob ha - Kohen , the first known Kabbalist in Castile ( Soria ) , in his Commentary to ... of R. Zarfati on the Book Ma'arekhet ha - Elohuť , master's thesis , The Hebrew University , 1987 , p .
. . The whole book is a superb piece of work, highly recommended.”—Destructive Music “Particularly atmospheric . . . This is an unusual and welcome selection of illustrations.”—Military Illustrated
科尔的说法显示了德国存在的一种无辜感,各种政治团体和政治学家试图用它来定义新近出现的德国的自我价值观。 阿道夫·穆斯克的意图是检验这些德国新人的教育情况。他以对十九岁的斯特凡妮的采访为起点,尤其注意她对学校中种种事情的叙述,以及她的老师对第 ...
Plöckinger, Geschichte, 33, footnote to Paula Schlier, Petras Aufzeichnungen, (Innsbruck: Brenner-Verlag, 1926), 136. Hemmrich, “Adolf Hitler,” 16. Facsimile of letter in Toland, Adolf Hitler, 224–25. Hess, Briefe, 332.
注487 赵:《论共同犯“思联络”的观预备性》,载《武汉大学学报(哲学科学)》2007年 6期。注488 〔苏联〕伊宁:《犯构成的一学说》,秉忠等译,中国人大学 1958年, 234页。注489 张旭主编:《英美刑论要》,清华大学 2006 年, 121—122页。
This book explores the connection between beer, culture, and politics in Munich to examine the crucial role the city has played in the development of modern Germany over the last thousand years.
358—3 59. 75. Litvinov (Geneva) to Narkomindel, Sept. 15, 193 8, DIMS, pp. 213—214. 76. Fierlinger to Czech foreign ministry, Sept. 19, 1 9 3 8, DIMS, p. 236. 77. Coulondre, nos. 694—696, Sept. 17, 193 8, DDF, 2°, XI, 278-279. 78.
Between 1950 and 1955, thousands of veterans from the notorious German-led, Ukrainian 14th Waffen-SS Galicia Division emigrated to North America with the full consent of the governments despite immigration regulations...