Epistemic Justification collects twelve distinguished and influential essays in epistemology by William P. Alston taken from a body of work spanning almost two decades. They represent the gradual development of Alston's thought in epistemology.He concentrates on topics that are central to contemporary epistemology and provides a much-needed and useful map to these issues be explicitly distinguishing and interrelating concepts of justification used in epistemology. More important, he develops and defends his own distinctive epistemic view throughout the volume. Notably, he argues for an account of justification that combines both internalist and externalist features. In addition, he discusses various forms of foundationalism and supports a moderate form. Finally, Alston demonstrates that the epistemic circularity that often plagues our attempts to validate our basic sources of belief does not prevent our showing that they are reliable sources of knowledge.
The second part of the book begins by developing the author's own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement.
This book proposes an original theory of epistemic justification that offers a new way to relate justification to the epistemic goal of truth-conducive belief.
Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core internalist intuitions without construing justification as an internal condition knowable by reflection ...
Beyond "Justification" also contains discussions of fundamental questions about the epistemic status of principles and beliefs and appropriate responses to various kinds of skepticism.
In the original case the defeater is something that Feldman has stored in memory—that is very different from it simply being in a book that Feldman could have, but has not, read. Feldman's distinction between current-state rationality ...
This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind.
With one exception, all of the papers in this volume were originally presented at a conference held in April, 1978, at The Ohio State University.
Against various detractors (e.g. Wilfred Sellars, Donald Davidson, etc.), this book develops a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification.
This text examines epistemic duty, doxastic voluntarism, the normativity of justification, internalism versus externalism, truth as the epistemic goal, and scepticism and the search for justification.
belief, according to objective positive coherentism, derive from this belief's cohering with some maximally coherent ... with the isolation objection that this claim is at best dubious on pure coherentist accounts of maximal coherence.