A critical examination of the history of US-Palestinian relations The United States has invested billions of dollars and countless diplomatic hours in the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution. Yet American attempts to broker an end to the conflict have repeatedly come up short. At the center of these failures lay two critical factors: Israeli power and Palestinian politics. While both Israelis and Palestinians undoubtedly share much of the blame, one also cannot escape the role of the United States, as the sole mediator in the process, in these repeated failures. American peacemaking efforts ultimately ran aground as a result of Washington's unwillingness to confront Israel's ever-deepening occupation or to come to grips with the realities of internal Palestinian politics. In particular, the book looks at the interplay between the U.S.-led peace process and internal Palestinian politics--namely, how a badly flawed peace process helped to weaken Palestinian leaders and institutions and how an increasingly dysfunctional Palestinian leadership, in turn, hindered prospects for a diplomatic resolution. Thus, while the peace process was not necessarily doomed to fail, Washington's management of the process, with its built-in blind spot to Israeli power and Palestinian politics, made failure far more likely than a negotiated breakthrough. Shaped by the pressures of American domestic politics and the special relationship with Israel, Washington's distinctive "blind spot" to Israeli power and Palestinian politics has deep historical roots, dating back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. The size of the blind spot has varied over the years and from one administration to another, but it is always present.
Updated through the first term of President George W. Bush, this edition analyses how each US president since Lyndon Johnson has dealt with the complex challenge of Arab-Israeli peacemaking.
Gordon to Epstein , 17 June 1940 , and Epstein to Gordon , 17 July 1940 , both in CZA , S25 / 4549 ( Heb . ) . 60. Black , “ Zionism and the Arabs , ” p . 278 . 61. Sasson contracted with one M.N. in Lebanon for the publication of 75 ...
McMahon ( 1862-1949 ) , British High Commissioner in Cairo , negotiated with Sharif Hussein of Mecca . He had approached the High Commissioner in July 1915 , offering Arab aid against Turkey if Britain , in return , would pledge support ...
In response to a surprise incursion by Hezbollah combatants into northern Israel and their abduction of two Israeli soldiers, Israel launched a campaign that included the most complex air offensive to have taken place in the history of the ...
A vivid, intellectual journey through the works of the renowned writer
Anything written today concerning the Jewish nation is significant. But when a book appears from the pen of a scholar such as Dr. Charles L. Feinberg, it becomes significant indeed. This book will stir much thought on the part of readers.
The responsibility for co - ordinating the efforts to advance the peace process fell to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State , Richard Murphy . He was trying to narrow the gap between what Peres could deliver and what Hussein could ...
The Case for Moral Clarity: Israel, Hamas and Gaza
Initiating. peres in not only a politician for the late twentieth century; he is Cognizant of his responsibility to those who came before and Thos who will follow.
Machomenos gia tēn eirēnē