Essays on the Politics of Regulation

ISBN-10: 1124013830
ISBN-13: 9781124013831
Category: Competition
Pages: 226
Language: English
Published: 2010
Author: Stephen Weymouth

Description

This dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and three distinct yet thematically related papers. The purpose of the dissertation is to explain variation in regulatory policy across countries by highlighting the institutional (supply) and interest group (demand) determinants of policy. I develop and test theory explaining regulatory policy outcomes at several levels of analysis. Chapter 1 introduces the topic and related literature. Chapter 2 focuses on the supply of regulatory policy by examining how political institutions affect the responsiveness of policymakers to consumer interests. I argue that the political influence of consumers depends on the level of democracy. To test the theory, I develop an original dataset measuring competition agency design in 156 developing countries covering the period 1975-2007. I estimate hazard models on the timing of competition policy reform. I also create an original index of governments' commitments to antitrust policy and estimate its political determinants. The results confirm a link between democracy and the commitment to consumer-friendly regulatory policy. Chapter 3 holds institutions constant in order to examine the demand-side determinants of regulatory policy outcomes within democracies. I argue that competition policy enforcement reflects the relative political strength of two contending interest groups : a rent-preserving alliance of incumbent producers and affiliated labor opposes competition policies that erode its market dominance; a pro-competition coalition of consumers, unorganized workers, and entrepreneurs favors regulatory oversight. Tests of the timing and nature of reform in democracies support the argument that commitments to antitrust regulatory reform are weakened where the anticompetitive interest group is large and encompassing. Chapter 4 develops hypotheses regarding the firm-level determinants of lobbying and political influence. I argue that economic power translates directly into political power : large, well-organized oligopolists are more likely to lobby and to influence government policy in their favor. I directly test lobbying activity and policy influence using firm-level survey data from over 20,000 firms operating in 41 countries. The results suggest that the political power of the firm increases with its size, market power, and participation in business associations. There is some evidence that the substantive impact of these microeconomic determinants of political influence depends on the level of democracy.

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