The concept of the individual and his/her motivations is a bedrock of philosophy. All strands of thought at heart come down to a particular theory of the individual. Economics, though, is guilty of taking this hugely important concept without questioning how we theorise it. This superb book remedies this oversight. The new approach put forward by Davis is to pay more attention to what moral philosophy may offer us in the study of personal identity, self consciousness and will. This crosses the traditional boundaries of economics and will shed new light on the distinction between positive and normative analysis in economics. With both heterodox and orthodox economics receiving a thorough analysis from Davis, this book is at once inclusive and revealing.
The book contains a short review of mathematical models and discussion of received microeconomic theory, as well as summaries at the ends of chapters and many examples and illustrations.
This book examines the different conceptions of the individual that have emerged in recent new approaches in economics, including behavioral economics, experimental economics, social preferences approaches, game theory, neuroeconomics, ...
This book examines the different conceptions of the individual that have emerged in recent new approaches in economics, including behavioral economics, experimental economics, social preferences approaches, game theory, neuroeconomics, ...
A Theory of the Individual for Economic Analysis
Sample Text
The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author.
In Figures 3.26a and 3.26b we show the Lorenz curve for the two extreme cases (the least concentrated in the left panel and the most concentrated in the right one). To have a global picture of the market we made a smoothed (Gaussian ...
This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers.
The literature on the theory of social choice has grown considerably beyond the few items in existence at the time the first edition of this book appeared in 1951.
In any two-player game, if the players deliberate to a Nash equilibrium (x,y) of that game, there is a shared intention that Z, where Z is the outcome of (x,y). (I shall explain why in the next paragraph.) Conversely, in any two-player ...