Russia-Georgia War: An Abortive Attempt to Integrate Georgia

ISBN-10
1321267681
ISBN-13
9781321267686
Category
Georgia (Republic)
Pages
99
Language
English
Published
2014
Authors
Ievgen Avramenko, University of Wyoming. Department of Global and Area Studies

Description

Even though the Russia-Georgia War was clearly the act of provocation and ultimately aggression by Russia, Georgia fired first shot. How could any sensible Georgian decisionmaker initiate a military assault on Tskhinvali in the face of a large-scale Russian military forces placed north of the border, giving the obvious risk of provoking a full-blown response from Russia that Georgia could not militarily resist? This thesis investigates Georgia's expectations and rationale in going to war by focusing on psychological dimensions of Georgian internal decisionmaking. Using Johnson & Tierney's psychological approach to explain the decision to attack, the author argues that Saakashvili's overconfidence and inaccurate predictions of Georgia's capabilities and Russia's response, together with positive illusion of U.S. involvement, led to the president's decision to restore constitutional order over South Ossetia by force, and eventually led to a futile war with Russia.

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