Studies of public finance, as traditionally developed, have analyzed the effects of fiscal institutions on the market-choice behavior of individuals and firms, but this book takes a different approach. It analyzes the effects of fiscal institutions on the political-choice behavior of individuals as they participate variously in the decision-making processes of democracies. What effect will the form of a new tax have on individuals' attitudes toward more or less public spending? To what extent does the private sector--public sector mix depend on the way in which tax payments are made? How do the various taxes affect the fiscal consciousness of individual citizens? These are questions that have been ignored for the most part. They are, nonetheless, important and worthy of examination. This book is an attempt to provide some provisional answers. By the use of simplified models of existing tax institutions, Buchanan predicts the effects that these exert on individual behavior in the area of political choice. The relative effects of direct and indirect taxes, the "old tax--new tax" distinction, the effects of fiscal earmarking, the effects of unbalanced budgets -- these are a few of the topics examined. Before these questions can be fully answered, research must be conducted to find out just how much individuals know about the taxes they pay and the benefits they receive. Comparatively little research of this kind has been completed, but the author devotes a chapter to a careful review of the present state of this sort of research. Individuals' choice among alternative fiscal institutions is examined in the second part of the book. If given the opportunity, how would the individual choose to pay his or her taxes? Progressive income taxes, excise taxes, and public debt are analyzed in terms of this question. Because of its interdisciplinary approach, this imaginative study will be of interest to both economists and political scientists.
The purpose of this book is to contribute to a meaningful dialogue between these two groups, in the belief that the future of both political economy and of normative public finance lies somewhere between the two approaches.
Constitutional political economy is the theme of the papers collected in this volume. This entire area of contemporary economic thought is a legacy of James M. Buchanan.
This monumental twenty-volume series presents the writings of James M. Buchanan, one of the great twentieth-century scholars of liberty.
In his foreword, Geoffrey Brennan states, ?The papers in this volume represent a coherent set of pieces focused on aspects of public-expenditure theory and constitute all of Buchanan's papers in this area.” Buchanan's work on the subject ...
As diverse as the papers presented in this volume may seem at first glance, all of them touch on two characteristic themes of James Buchanan's work: the respect for individual sovereignty and the threat of monopoly power on the rights of ...
This volume presents a collection of Buchanan's most representative works in economic method and analysis.
The book assumes a working knowledge of the standard conceptual framework within which the theory of public finance is commonly presented.
This final volume (save for the Index) in Liberty Fund's The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan acquaints us most intimately with the man himself. Included are essays and short pieces that shed light on Buchanan's view of the world.
Democratic decisions determine the allocation of resources through the public sector. Holcombe uses the median voter model as a base, but goes on to develop a more general multidimensional model...
This book will be useful to scholars of public economics, political science, and public administration as well as policy makers and those working in the public sector.