This book addresses a palpable, yet widely neglected, tension in legal discourse. In our everyday legal practices – whether taking place in a courtroom, classroom, law firm, or elsewhere – we routinely and unproblematically talk of the activities of creating and applying the law. However, when legal scholars have analysed this distinction in their theories (rather than simply assuming it), many have undermined it, if not dismissed it as untenable. The book considers the relevance of distinguishing between law-creation and law-application and how this transcends the boundaries of jurisprudential enquiry. It argues that such a distinction is also a crucial component of political theory. For if there is no possibility of applying a legal rule that was created by a different institution at a previous moment in time, then our current constitutional-democratic frameworks are effectively empty vessels that conceal a power relationship between public authorities and citizens that is very different from the one on which constitutional democracy is grounded. After problematising the most relevant objections in the literature, the book presents a comprehensive defence of the distinction between creation and application of law within the structure of constitutional democracy. It does so through an integrated jurisprudential methodology, which combines insights from different disciplines (including history, anthropology, political science, philosophy of language, and philosophy of action) while also casting new light on long-standing issues in public law, such as the role of legal discretion in the law-making process and the scope of the separation of powers doctrine.
" -- Perspectives on Politics "This is a significant, impressive work of constitutional theory in its largest and most important sense.
Drawn from a series of lectures given in Jakarta, Indonesia, on the drafting of the U.S. constitution, the book illustrates the problems faced by generations of founders, through numerous historic and contemporary examples.
Janos Kis outlines a new theory of constitutional democracy.
A valuable resource for specialists, the book also will be of use in political science and law school classes.
How to Save a Constitutional Democracy mounts an urgent argument that we can no longer afford to be complacent.
The eleven essays in this volume, supplemented by an editorial introduction, centre around three overlapping problems.
Donald L. Horowitz argues that constitutional processes ought to be geared to securing commitment to democracy by those who participate in constitutional processes.
This book examines a selection of themes that have become salient in contemporary debates on constitutional democracies.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 Philip H. Wicksteed , The Common Sense of Political Economy ( London : Macmillan , 1910 ) , chap . V. 2 . There are , of course , exceptions . See Arthur Bentley , The Process of Government .
Founding Acts explores the relationship between constitutional claims of popular sovereignty and the practice of constitution-making in our pluralistic age.