This report seeks to better understand why the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has been more successful than its predecessor organization, al Qaeda, in recruiting individuals within the United States. The authors consider whether the demographic profile of individuals drawn to foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) has changed over time or whether new groups are more successful appealing to the same segment of the population. They take an expansive approach, analyzing all known cases of U.S. citizens or persons within the United States connected to a FTO with Islamist orientation since September 11, 2001, and use consistent criteria for inclusion and exclusion to identify individuals meeting this definition, and coding multiple demographic variables. They then conduct a quantitative analysis of the entire population, as well as the population broken down by group and by role (i.e., foreign fighters, homegrown violent extremists, etc.). Their findings reveal that the number of U.S. recruits drawn to al Qaeda and its affiliate groups has declined precipitously, commensurate with the ascent of ISIL, and that the average terrorist recruited by ISIL is not only younger and less educated but more likely to be African American/black or Caucasian/white and a U.S.-born citizen. Historically, terrorist recruits were more likely immigrants of Middle Eastern descent. These findings are relevant to U.S. defense, intelligence, and law enforcement officials, as well as to civilian academic and policymaking audiences, who may be unaware of this altered demographic profile, a perception that could bias counterterrorism policy and efforts.
Provides the final report of the 9/11 Commission detailing their findings on the September 11 terrorist attacks.
This publication contains a report that evaluates the main problems that arise in the context of cyberterrorism and provides recommendations, together with reports on the situation in the member and observer states of the Council of Europe ...
Since 9/11, al-Qaeda attacks outside war zones have killed few americans (mueller 2006).2 Complementary and equally ... assistant secretary of defense for special operations, “al-Qaida wasn't as good as we thought they were on 9/11.
Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation , " Mapping Militants : Al Shabaab . ” 34. ... Chandler , and Robinson , Trends in the Draw of Americans to Foreign Terrorist Organizations from 9/11 to Today 43.
Trends in the draw of Americans to foreign terrorist organizations from 9/11 to today. RAND Corporation. World Bank. (2006, March 15). Faiths and ethics agenda in the world bank: History, progress and options (Working paper).
Carlton Carey and his wife, Mildred Banks, we to police an know, however, that there were moles within their dissenter circle who reported back to Hulon. When the couple got home, they were attacked by men wearing ski masks.
Donahue, John J. III and Steven D. Levitt (2001), “The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime,” Journal of Economics ... Enders, Walter, Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley (1990), “UN Conventions, Technology and Retaliation in the Fight against ...
Toward that end, Coulson permitted Ellison to call in the second third-party negotiator: Robert Millar. Coulson dispatched a plane to Oklahoma to pick up the Identity patriarch. He arrived around noon and was permitted to join Ellison ...
The manual seeks to provide guidance on international legal instruments against FTF activities and techniques for digital investigation and evidence collection, especially concerning global financial transactions and social media activity.
Radicalization to Terrorism: What Everyone Needs to Know synthesizes original and existing research to answer the questions raised after each new attack, including those committed by radicalized Americans.