Zero-knowledge interactive proofsystems are a new technique which can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing provably secure protocols. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff originally suggested this technique for controlling the knowledge released in an interactive proof of membership in a language, and for classification of languages [19]. In this approach, knowledge is defined in terms of complexity to convey knowledge if it gives a computational advantage to the receiver, theory, and a message is said for example by giving him the result of an intractable computation. The formal model of interacting machines is described in [19, 15, 171. A proof-system (for a language L) is an interactive protocol by which one user, the prover, attempts to convince another user, the verifier, that a given input x is in L. We assume that the verifier is a probabilistic machine which is limited to expected polynomial-time computation, while the prover is an unlimited probabilistic machine. (In cryptographic applications the prover has some trapdoor information, or knows the cleartext of a publicly known ciphertext) A correct proof-system must have the following properties: If XE L, the prover will convince the verifier to accept the pmf with very high probability. If XP L no prover, no matter what program it follows, is able to convince the verifier to accept the proof, except with vanishingly small probability.
This book contains the proceedings of the EUROCRYPT '87 conference, a workshop on theory and applications of cryptographic techniques held at Amsterdam, April 1987. 26 papers were selected from over twice that number submitted to the ...
W. DIFFIE AND M. HELLMAN, “New Directions in Cryptography,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, ... “Cryptographic Computation: Secure Fault–Tolerant Protocols and the Public-Key Model,” CRYPTO-87 Proceedings, 135-155.
Annual meetings on this topic also take place in Europe and are regularly published in this Lecture Notes series under the name of EUROCRYPT. This volume presents the proceedings of the ninth CRYPTO meeting.
The papers in this volume were presented at the CRYPTO '88 conference on theory and applications of cryptography, held in Santa Barbara, California, August 21-25, 1988.
This book is the proceedings of CRYPTO 86, one in a series of annual conferences devoted to cryptologic research. They have all been held at the University of California at Santa Barbara.
Annotation This book contains the proceedings of the EUROCRYPT '87 conference, a workshop on theory and applications of cryptographic techniques held at Amsterdam, April 1987. 26 papers were selected from over twice that number submitted to ...
Advances in cryptology — CRYPTO '87, proceedings of the conference on the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques held at the University of California, Santa Barbara, California, August 16–20, 1987.
D. Chaum, I. B. Damgaard and J. van de Graaf, “Multiparty computations ensuring privacy of each party's input and correctness of the result”, in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'87, LNCS 293. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1988, pp. 87-119.
In Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO '87, volume 293 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 156–166, Springer-Verlag, 1988. [BDS98] M. Burmester, Y. Desmedt and J. Seberry. Equitable Key Escrow with Limited Time Span. In Advances in ...
Praise for Applied Cryptography "This book should be on the shelf of any computer professional involved in the use or implementation of cryptography.