Security protocols are widely used to ensure secure communications over insecure networks, such as the internet or airwaves. These protocols use strong cryptography to prevent intruders from reading or modifying the messages. However, using cryptography is not enough to ensure their correctness. Combined with their typical small size, which suggests that one could easily assess their correctness, this often results in incorrectly designed protocols. The authors present a methodology for formally describing security protocols and their environment. This methodology includes a model for describing protocols, their execution model, and the intruder model. The models are extended with a number of well-defined security properties, which capture the notions of correct protocols, and secrecy of data. The methodology can be used to prove that protocols satisfy these properties. Based on the model they have developed a tool set called Scyther that can automatically find attacks on security protocols or prove their correctness. In case studies they show the application of the methodology as well as the effectiveness of the analysis tool. The methodology’s strong mathematical basis, the strong separation of concerns in the model, and the accompanying tool set make it ideally suited both for researchers and graduate students of information security or formal methods and for advanced professionals designing critical security protocols.
Cremers, C., Mauw, S.: Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols. Information Security and Cryptography Series. Springer, Berlin (2012) 14. Dolev, D., Yao, A.: On the Security of Public-Key Protocols. IEEE Trans.
Cremers, C., Mauw, S.: Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols. Information Security and Cryptography series. Springer, Heidelberg (2012) 7. David, A., Larsen, K.G., et al.: UPPAAL SMC tutorial. Int. J. Softw.
Overview · mavlink developer guide (nd). https://mavlink.io/en/protocol/overview.html 2. ... C. Cremers, S. Mauw, Operational semantics, in Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols (Springer, New York, 2012), pp.
Blanchet, B., Smyth, B., Cheval, V.: ProVerif 1.93: Automatic Cryptographic Protocol Verifier. User Manual and Tutorial (2016) ... 96–105 (2001) Cremers, C., Mauw, S.: Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols.
... Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), Vienna, Austria, pp. 287–294. IEEE Computer Society (2006) Cremers, C., Mauw, S.: Security properties. In: Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols ...
C. Cremers, S. Mauw, Operational semantics and verification of security protocols (Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2012, November) 25. C.J.F. Cremers, P. Lafourcade, P. Nadeau, Comparing state spaces in automatic security protocol analysis ...
KerNeeS: a protocol for mutual authentication between NFC phones and POS terminals for secure payment transactions. ... Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols Information Security and Cryptography, pp. 13–35.
iRODS primer 2: integrated rule-oriented data system. In: Synthesis Lectures on Information Concepts, Retrieval, and Services. Morgan & Claypool Publishers (2017). https://doi.org/10.2200/S00760ED1V01Y201702ICR057 Yamanaka, K., et al.
Delay in the network limits should be adjusted so that the honest user can execute the protocol and the Intruder was unable to acquire additional ... Cremers, C., Mauw, S.: Operational semantics and verification of security protocols.
Harrison, G., Knottenbelt, J.: Passage time distributions in large Markov chains. In: Proceedings of the 2002 ACM SIGMETRICS ... J. ACM 22(2), 249–260 (1975) Stewart, W.J.: An Introduction to the Numerical Solution of Markov Chains.