In a major Contribution to the theory of perception, A.D.Smith presents a truly original defense of direct realism the view that in perception we are directly aware of things in a physical world. It offers two arguements against direct realism-one conceening illusion, and one concerning hallueination that upto now no theory of perception could adequately rebut.At the heart of Smiths theory is a new way of drawing the distinction between perception and sensation alone with an unusual treatment of the nature of object of halluecination .
Written in 1959, this volume looks at the philosophical problems of perception, that arise mainly because our traditional common-sense notions clash with the factual evidence concerning not only the occurrence of illusions and ...
The chapters in the book address the problem of reference as it relates to perception and to debates about realism.
This book is a discussion of some of the major philosophical problems centering around the topic of sense perception and the foundations of human knowledge.
Useful examples are included throughout the book to illustrate the puzzles of perception, including hallucinations, illusions, the laws of appearance, blindsight, and neuroscientific explanations of our experience of pain, smell and color.
Some of the essays in this book defend the orthodoxy; most criticize it; and some propose alternatives to it. Many of the essays are classics.
The Good Will: A Study in the Coherence Theory of Goodness
Susanna Siegel argues that these two aspects of the mind become deeply intertwined when beliefs, fears, desires, or prejudice influence what we perceive.
... the relevant object causally corresponding to our observational concept—what that concept is “about”—is a table, ... to know what table-talk means, or what it could mean for such talk to be true, or how such talk could succeed in ...
consciousness does not exist.” But what they say is consciousness is really something else. In Daniel Dennett's case, he says it is really just a computer program running in the brain. And in John Campbell's case, he says conscious ...
In lightofthis,Siegel defends theclaimthat phenomenalcharacter caninvolve kind properties by ... characters involve only lowlevel properties is to accept [C]—that the visual experiences actually have different phenomenal character—but ...