In recent years, some have asked "Are we all originalists now?" and many have assumed that originalists have a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. In Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, James Fleming rejects originalisms-whether old or new, concrete or abstract, living or dead. Instead, he defends what Ronald Dworkin called a "moral reading" of the United States Constitution, or a "philosophic approach" to constitutional interpretation. He refers to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles-not codifying concrete historical rules or practices-and of interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood-not merely historical research to discover relatively specific original meanings. Through examining the spectacular concessions that originalists have made to their critics, he shows the extent to which even they acknowledge the need to make normative judgments in constitutional interpretation. Fleming argues that fidelity in interpreting the Constitution as written requires a moral reading or philosophic approach. Fidelity commits us to honoring our aspirational principles, not following the relatively specific original meanings (or original expected applications) of the founders. Originalists would enshrine an imperfect Constitution that does not deserve our fidelity. Only a moral reading or philosophic approach, which aspires to interpret our imperfect Constitution so as to make it the best it can be, gives us hope of interpreting it in a manner that may deserve our fidelity.
In this monograph, James E. Fleming argues that fidelity in interpreting the US Constitution as written requires a moral reading or philosophic approach, and that fidelity commits to honouring aspirational principles, not following the ...
Besides Tushnet's and Sunstein's work, and the works cited supra note 157, the most promising work includes NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS ...
Walter Dellinger, assistant attorney general, memorandum to Bernard N. Nussbaum, counsel to the president, “The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements,” 17 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131 (1993), ...
Against recurring charges that the practice of substantive due process is dangerously indeterminate and irredeemably undemocratic, Constructing Basic Liberties reveals the underlying coherence and structure of substantive due process and ...
For the idea of public reason (or public reasonableness), see John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993): 212–54; John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in John Rawls, Collected Papers ...
As this book argues, promoting active liberty requires judicial modesty and deference to Congress; it also means recognizing the changing needs and demands of the populace.
Exploring Law's Empire is a collection of essays examining the work of Ronald Dworkin in the philosophy of law and constitutionalism.
Few constitutional scholars or judges argue that original meaning is irrelevant to constitutional interpretation.32 In the words of Professor Mitch Berman, “not a single self-identifying non-originalist of whom I'm aware argues that ...
The first work of both constitutional and foundational theory by one of America's leading legal minds, Fidelity & Constraint maps strategies that both help judges understand the fundamental conflict at the heart of interpretation whenever ...
Elegantly written and cuttingly insightful, Taking Rights Seriously is one of the most important works of public thought of the last fifty years.