Black Gold and Blackmail seeks to explain why great powers adopt such different strategies to protect their oil access from politically motivated disruptions. In extreme cases, such as Imperial Japan in 1941, great powers fought wars to grab oil territory in anticipation of a potential embargo by the Allies; in other instances, such as Germany in the early Nazi period, states chose relatively subdued measures like oil alliances or domestic policies to conserve oil. What accounts for this variation? Fundamentally, it is puzzling that great powers fear oil coercion at all because the global market makes oil sanctions very difficult to enforce. Rosemary A. Kelanic argues that two variables determine what strategy a great power will adopt: the petroleum deficit, which measures how much oil the state produces domestically compared to what it needs for its strategic objectives; and disruptibility, which estimates the susceptibility of a state's oil imports to military interdiction—that is, blockade. Because global markets undercut the effectiveness of oil sanctions, blockade is in practice the only true threat to great power oil access. That, combined with the devastating consequences of oil deprivation to a state's military power, explains why states fear oil coercion deeply despite the adaptive functions of the market. Together, these two variables predict a state's coercive vulnerability, which determines how willing the state will be to accept the costs and risks attendant on various potential strategies. Only those great powers with large deficits and highly disruptible imports will adopt the most extreme strategy: direct control of oil through territorial conquest.
For a state to be at risk of oil coercion, it must have some degree of baseline vulnerability.
Blackmail. or .. . ? The new day helped to sort out the previous night's turmoil in James's mind Before reporting the string of strange incidents to Dick Elli0t, he felt compelled to establish whether the compromising of the commander ...
See also regime type Depp, Johnny, 111 Al- Din, Ghazi Nasr, 101 direct control. See anticipatory energy security strategies of great powers Doha, 110, 111, 112 Dune (Herbert), 214, 233 Dutch Disease, 127 Central Command (CENTCOM), ...
28 Rosemary A. Kelanic, Black Gold and Blackmail: Oil and Great Power Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021). 29 Clayton, Market Madness, 62. 30 Yergin, The Prize, chapter 6. 31 Nominally, there were thirty-eight ...
“Black Gold and Blackmail: The Politics of International Oil Coercion.” PhD diss., University of Chicago. Keohane, Robert O. 2009. “The Old IPE and the New.” Review of International Political Economy 16, no.
Rosemary Kelanic, “Black Gold and Blackmail: The Politics of International Oil Coercion,” PhD dissertation, University of Chicago , 2012. 12. Marc Trachtenberg, “Waltzing to Armageddon?” National Interest (Fall 2002). 13.
Kelanic, R.A. (2020), Black Gold and Blackmail: Oil and Great Power Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Klare, M.T. (2001), Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, New York: Metropolitan Book.
That definition follows Michael Doyle's (Doyle 1986: 12, 19) renowned work on the subject, except that my conception is politically formal and direct. I do not include “informal” empires (Gallagher and Robinson 1953; Doyle 1986).
Should the United States ask its military to guarantee the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf? If the US security commitment is in fact strategically sound, what posture should the military adopt to protect Persian Gulf oil?
Black Gold and Blackmail: Oil and Great Power Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kemp, G. 2000. US-Iranian relations: Competition and cooperation in the Caspian Basin. In Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus ...