A treatment of disjunctivism about visual experiences in the service of defending a naive realist theory of veridical visual perception, this book includes detailed theories of hallucination and illusion that show how such states can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences without sharing any common character.
The book may now be characterized as a sustained effort to set forth, in the light of the most recent psychical and neurological researches, the "common organic principle which, under whatever diversity of conditions, underlies alike normal ...
This book presents a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perception that is informed by empirical research.
In a major Contribution to the theory of perception, A.D.Smith presents a truly original defense of direct realism the view that in perception we are directly aware of things in a physical world.
This volume offers interdisciplinary perspectives on the nature of hallucination, offering essays by both scientists and philosophers.
Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, this book is an ideal starting point for anyone studying disjunctivism for the first time, as well as for more advanced students and researchers.
Useful examples are included throughout the book to illustrate the puzzles of perception, including hallucinations, illusions, the laws of appearance, blindsight, and neuroscientific explanations of our experience of pain, smell and color.
What Do Philosophers Do? takes up the skeptical arguments from this everyday point of view, and ultimately concludes that they don't undermine our ordinary beliefs or our ordinary ways of finding out about the world.
Is naive realism compatible with holding that perception has content? This volume brings together philosophers representing many different perspectives to address these and other central questions in the philosophy of perception.
J. Christopher Maloney argues that, unlike other cognitive modes, perception is in fact immediate, direct acquaintance with the object of thought.
In lightofthis,Siegel defends theclaimthat phenomenalcharacter caninvolve kind properties by ... characters involve only lowlevel properties is to accept [C]—that the visual experiences actually have different phenomenal character—but ...